In re Hallinan by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
7-9-1954
In re Hallinan
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, In re Hallinan 43 Cal.2d 243 (1954).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/496
[8. F. No. 19053. In Bank. July 9, 1954.] 
In re VINCENT W. HALLINAN for Disbarment of Member 
of State Bar of CaliforniL 
I 
[1] Attotn8)'S-Disciplinary Proceedings-Proceedings on Convic-
tion of Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.-An attorney whose 
disbarment is sought on ground of conviction of crime involv-
ing moral turpitude has not made required showing of dis-
crimination to sustain his contention that he is being denied 
equal protection of the laws, where he has not directly chal-
lenged by appeal or otherwise propriety of his conviction for 
violating Internal Revenue Code, § 145, subd. (b), by willfully 
and knowingly filing false and fraudulent income tax returm, 
and where he has not shown that others demonstrably guilty of 
violating such section have not been prosecuted or that the 
section is administered discriminatorily against a class to which 
he belongs. 
~2] Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving 
Moral Turpitude.-An attorney whose disbarment was sought 
on the ground that he had been convicted, after trial, of • 
crime involving moral turpitude was not. entitled to claim dis-
crimination because the State Bar failed to proceed against 
other attorneys who had pleaded nolo contendere, and the 
State Bar was ,justified in treating such plea as not being the 
equivalent of a plea or verdict of guilty within the meaning 
of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6101, prior to 1953 amendment. 
[3] Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving 
Moral Turpitude.-A crime in which intent to defraud is essen-
tial ell'ml'nt is a crime involving moral turpitude. 
[lJ See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 117. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 73 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Attorneys at Law, § 279 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,9-11,14] Attorneys, § 172.5; [2-8,121 
Attornels, § 141; [13] Courts, § 106; [15] Attorney, § 172. 
~) 
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(4] Id.-Disciplin&l'7 Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving 
Moral Turpitude.-·-Related group of offrnses involving inten-
tional dishonesty for purposes of personal gain are' crimes 
involving moral turpitude. 
[6] Id.-Disciplin&l'7 Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving 
Moral Turpitude.-There is no moral distinction between de-
frauding an individual and defrauding the government, and 
an attorney who is convicted of either offense must be dis-
barred, since his conviction of such crime would necessarily 
involve moral turpitude. 
[6] Id.-Disciplinal'7 Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving 
Moral Turpitude.-If conviction for any crime can be had 
without proof of facts showing moral turpitude, an attorney 
convicted of such crime cannot be summarily disbarred under 
Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6101, 6102. 
[7] Id.-Disciplina17 Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving 
Moral Turpitude.-Moral turpitude must be inherent in com-
mission of crime itself to warrant summary disbarment under 
Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6101, 6102. 
[8] Id.-Discipl1na.l'7 Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving 
Moral Turpitude.-An attorney can be summarily disbarred 
only when record of conviction is conclusive evidence that crime 
of which he was convicted involves moral turpitude. 
[9] Id.-Disciplina17 Proceedings-Proceedings on Conviction of 
Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.-Provision that record of 
conviction is conclusive evidence was inserted in statute to 
enable Supreme Court to disbar an attorney, convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude, without giving him further 
notice or hearing. 
[10] Id.-Disciplinal'7 Proceedings-Proceedings on Conviction of 
Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.-Only when attorney is 
indicted for a crime the commission of which would in every 
case evidence a bad moral character, is issue of moral turpi-
tude tendered in criminal trial, and if he could be summarily 
disbarred after conviction for crime the minimum elements of 
which do not involve moral turpitude, he would never have an 
opportunity to be heard on issue on which his disbarment 
depends. 
[11] Id.-Disciplinal'7 Proceedings-Proceedings OD Conviction of 
Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.-In proceeding for disbar-
ment of attorney on ground of conviction of crime involving 
moral turpitude, Supreme Court will assume that every jury 
in criminal trial is properly instructed to convict defendant 
if they find minimum elements of offense charged, and it would 
be mere speculation to conclude in any ease that jury finds 
defendant guilty of conduct alleged in indictment, proof of 
which is unnecessary to his conviction, merely because jury 
brought in verdict of guilt,. 
) 
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[12] Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Oonviction of Orime Involving 
Moral Turpitude.-If intent to defraud· is not essential element 
of crime proscribed by Internal Revenue Code, § 145, subd. (b), 
making it an offense willfully to evade or defeat any income 
tax, an attorney convicted of such crime cannot be summarily 
disbarred. 
(13) Oourts-Decisions as Precedents.-Since Internal Revenue 
Code, § 145, subd. (b), making it an offense willfully to evade or 
defeat any income tax, is a United States statute, state 
Supreme Court must accept interpretation given it by United 
States courts. 
(14) Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Proceedings On Oon-
viction of Orime Involving Moral Turpitude.-When the con-
viction of an attorney does not warrant summary disbarment, 
but he may nevertheless have been guilty of acts involving 
\ moral turpitude, as when the conviction is for violating In-
ternal Revenue Code, § 145, subel. (b), discipline or disbarment 
should be imposed by nonsummary procedures; and the 
Supreme Court will refer the matter to the State Bar to in-
vestigate whether the convicted lawyer was guilty of miscon-
duct that requires his suspension or disbarment. 
[15] Id. - Disciplinary Proceedings - Who May Institute. - Su-
preme Court has inherent power over admission, suspension 
and disbarment of attorneys, and in exercise thereof can initi-
ate disciplinary proceedings on its own motion (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 6107) and, in doing so, it may adopt any suitable 
process or mode of proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 187.) 
PROCEEDING for disbarment of attorney. Motion to 
dismiss proceeding denied and matter referred to Board of 
Governors of State Bar for hearing, report and recommenda-
tion. 
Dreyfus, McTernan &; Lubliner and Benjamin Dreyfus for 
Petitioner. 
Gladstein, Andersen &; Leonard, George R. Andersen, Nor-
man Leonard, Charles R. Garry and James Martin MacInnis 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
Garrett H. Elmore and Herman F. Selvin for Respondent 
State Bar. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Vincent W. Hallinan was charged by in-
dictment. with violating section 145, subdivision (b), of thfl 
) 
) 
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Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 145, subd. (b))· by "will-
fully and knowingly fil[in~J false and fraudulent income tax 
returns. " The jury found him guilty as charged on five COllnts 
of the indictment. The court sentenced him to 18 months im-
prisonment on each cOllnt, the sentences to run concurrently, 
and fined him $50,000. He did not appeal, and the time for 
appeal has now elapsed. The State Bar filed with this court a 
certified copy of the indictment and judgment of conviction, 
contending that it calls for Hallinan's disbarment under sec-
tion 6101 t and 6102:\: of the Business and Professions Code. 
These sections provide for the summary disbarment of at-
torneys who are convicted of "a felony or misdemeanor, in-
volving moral turpitude .. _ ." Hallinan objects to the entry 
of an order of disbarment and moves that the proceeding be 
dismissed on the grounds that he is being deprived of equal 
protection of the laws, that the term "moral turpitude" in 
sections 6101 and 6102 is too vague, uncertain, and indefinite 
to meet the requirements of due process of law, and that in any 
event the crime proscribed by section 145, subdivision (b), 
does not involve moral turpitude. 
[1] Hallinan has not made the required showing of dis-
crimination to sustain his contention that he is being denied 
equal protection of the laws. (See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 
·"Any person required under this chapter to collect, account for, and 
pay over any tax imposed by this chapter, who willfully fails to collect 
or truthfully account for and pay over such tnx, and any person who 
willfully attempts in any mallner to evade or defeat any tax imposed 
by this chapter or the payment thereof, shall, in adtlition tl. other 
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction 
thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned . for not more 
than five years, or both, together with the ('osts of prosecution." 
t" Conviction of a felon,. or misdemeanor, involving moral turpitude, 
constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspension as provided in section 
6102. 
"The record of conviction shall be conclusive evidence and the clerk 
of the court in which the conviction is had shall, within thirty days 
tbereafter, transmit a certified copy .of the record of conviction to the 
Supreme Court. The proceedings to disbar or suspend an attorney shall 
be undertaken by the court upon ret'eipt of the certified copy ot the 
record ot conviction. 
"A plea or verdict of guilty'or a plea of nolo contendere is deemed 
to be a ('onyirtion within the meaning of this section." 
t"Upon the receipt ot the certified copy of the record ot conviction 
of an attorney of a crime involving moral turpitude, the eourt sholl 
••. order the attorney disbarred when the time for appeal has elapsed 
or the judgment of convi('tion has been affirmed on appeal. ••. 
"The other provisions of this :trticle providing a pl'ocE'dure tor the 
disbarment or slI!lpension of an nttorney do not apply to nil nttorllE'Y 
convit'tcn ot a crime iuVOlvini moral turpitude, uuleBS expressl1 made 
applicable." 
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I1.S. 1,8 [64 s.Ot. 397, 88 IJ.Ed. 497].) He has not directly 
challenged by appeal or otherwise the propriety of his prose-
cution and conviction for violating section 145, subdivision (b). 
Nor has he shown that others demonstrably guilty of violating 
that section have not been prosecuted, or that the section is ad-
ministered discriminatorily against a class to which he belongs 
(See In re Pearson, 30 Oa1.2d 871, 876-878 [186 P.2d 401] ; 
Snowden v. Hughes, supra, 321 U.S. 1, 8; Southern By. 00. v. 
Watts, 260 U.S. 519, 526 [43 S.Ot. 192,67 L.Ed. 375]; Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374 [6 S.Ot. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 
220].) [2] He claims that he is being discriminated against be-
cause the State Bar has failed to file with this court the records 
of conviction of other attorneys prosecuted for tax offenses. 
Information supplied by the State Bar shows that of the five 
attorn.eys involved, a record of conviction of violating section 
145, subdivision (b), was filed in one case, but the attorney died 
before action was taken by this court, and in another an appeal 
is still pending. The State Bar has taken no action with re-
spect to the remaining three, who were adjudged guilty of the 
offenses charged on pleas of nolo contendere. In view of Oami. 
netti v. Imperial Mut. L. Ins. 00., 59 Oal.App.2d 476, 490-492 
[139 P.2d 681), holding that a plea of nolo contendere is not 
the equivalent of a plea of guilty and cannot be used in another 
proceeding as an admission against the person so pleading, the 
State Bar was justified in concluding that such a plea was not 
the equivalent of a "plea or verdict of guilty" within the 
meaning of section 6101 of the Business and Professions Oode.· 
[3] Although the problem of defining moral turpitude is 
not without difficulty (see In re Hatch, 10 Oa1.2d 147, 151 
[73 P.2d 885) ; dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in 
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 [71 S.Ot. 703, 95 L.Ed. 
886); Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451), it is 
settled that whatever else it may mean, it includes fraud and 
that a crime in which an intent to defraud is an essential 
element is a crime involving moral turpitude. (Jordan v. 
De George, supra, 341 U.S. 223, 227; United States v. Reimer, 
113 F.2d 429, 431: United States v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022; In re 
Orane [Oa1.], 189 P. 1072; see also Ex Parle Wall, 107 U.S. 
265, 273 [2 S.Ot. 569, 27 L.Ed. 552] ; People v. Wisecarver, 67 
Oa1.App.2d 203, 208 [153 P.2d 778].) [4] It is also settled 
that the related group of offenses involving intentional dis-
-That section has since been amended to ilu:lude pleaa of aow 00.-
tender.. (State. 1953, chap. 44, t L) 
) 
) 
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honesty for purposes of personal gain are crimes involviu.:-
moral turpitude. (In re Rothrock, 25 Ca1.2d 588 [154 P.2d 
392) [petty theft] ; Werner v. State Bar, 24 Ca1.2d 611 [150 
P.2d 892) [attempted bribe and grand theft) ; Moura v: State 
Bar, 18 Ca1.2d 31 [112 P.2d 629] [forgery]; Suspension of 
Hickman, 18 Ca1.2d 71 [113 P.2d 1] [grand theft}; In re 
McAUister, 14 Cal.2d 602 [95 P.2d 932] [conspiracy to violate 
the General Cemetery Act by misrepresenting cemetery lots 
offered for sale] ; Barton v. State Bar, 2 Ca1.2d 294 [40 P.2d 
502) [attempted extortion] ; Oster v. State Bar, 2 Ca1.2d 625 
[42 P.2d 627] [misappropriation of a client's fundsl ; In re 
Shinn {Cal.], 186 P. 772 [forgery]; Matter of Ooffe'll. 123 
Cal. 522 {56 P. 448) [attempted extortion] ; In re Thompson, 
37 Cal.App. 344,348 [174 P. 86] [knowingly receiving prop-
erty stolen from the mails]; see also In re Rothrock, 
16 CaUd 449, 454 [166 P.2d 907, 131 A.L.R. 226].) The fraud-
ulent acquisition of another's property is but another form of 
theft in this state. (Pen. Code, § 484.) [5] We see no moral 
distinction between defrauding an individual and defrauding 
the government (United States v. Reimer, supra, 113 F.2d 429, 
430-431), and an attorney, whose standard of conduct should 
be one of complete honesty (McGregor v. State Bar, 24 Ca1.2d 
283,288-289 [148 P.2d 865), who is convicted of either offense 
is not worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients, the 
courts, or the public, and must be disbarred, since his convic-
tion of such a crime would necessarily involve moral turpitude. 
[6] Conversely, if a conviction for any crime can be had 
without proof of facts showing moral turpitude, an attorney 
convicted of such a crime cannot be summarily disbarred 
under sections 6101 and 6102 of the Business and Professions 
Code. ['1] Moral turpitude must be inherent in the com-
mission of the crime itself to warrant summary. disbarment 
under those sections. As we said in In re Rothrock. 16 Ca1.2d 
449, 454 [106 P.2d 907, 131 A.L.R. 226), an "attorney'. 
name will not be stricken from the rolls where the nature 
01 the particular cnffUI does not reflect a bad moral character 
with respect to the duties of the attorney's profession." 
[Italics added.] (See In re McAllister, supra, 14 Cal.2d 602. 
603-604.) [8] The language of the statute itself clearly in-
dicates that an attorney can be summarily disbarred only when 
the cnffUI of which he was convicted involves moral turpitude. 
Even if it is assumed that statements in the indictment or 
judgment of conviction describing conduct that goes beyond 
the essential elements of the crime charged are a part of the 
July 1954] IN RE HALUNAN 
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., record of conviction," as the State Bar contends, the record 
of conviction is "conclusive evidence" only when the crime it-
self necessarily involves moral turpitude. [9] The provision 
that the record of conviction is conclusive evidence was inserted 
in the statute in order that this court could disbar all attorney, 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, without giving 
him further notice or hearing. (In re Collins, 188 Cal. 701, 
703,706-708 [206 P. 990, 32 A.L.R. 1062].) [10] Only when 
an attorney is indicted for a crime the commission of which 
would in every case evidence a bad moral character, is the 
issue of moral turpitude tendered in the criminal trial. If an 
attorney could be summarily disbarred after conviction for 
a crime, the minimum elements of which do not involve moral 
turpitude, he would never have an opportunity to be heard 
on the issue on which his disbarment depends. [11] We 
must assume that every jury in a criminal trial is properly 
instrueted to convict the defendant if they find the minimum 
elements of the offense charged, and it would be mere specu-
lation to conclude in any case that a jury finds a defendant 
guilty of conduct alleged in the indictment, proof of which 
is unnecessary to his conviction, merely because the jury 
bronght in a verdict of guilty. 
A similar rule has been established by the federal courts. 
I n proceedings for the deportation of aliens twice convicted 
of "a crime involving moral turpitude" (8 U.S.C. § 1251, subd. 
(a) ( 4» it has been held that the crime of which the alien was 
convicted must necessarily involve moral turpitude to warrant 
deportation. (United States v. Neelly, 208 F.2d 337, 340-342; 
United States v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757, 759; United States v. Day, 
supra, 51 F.2d 1022; United States v. McOandless, 28 F.2d 287. 
288; see also United States v. Carrollo, 30 F.Supp. 3, 7; United 
States v. Karmuth, 1 F.Supp. 370, 373-376.) In these cases 
it is said that if by definition the crime "does not necessarily 
involve moral turpitude, the alien cannot be deported because 
in the particular instance his conduct was immoral. . . ." 
(United States v. Day, supra, 51 F.2d 1022; United States 
v. NeeUy, supra, 208 F.2d 337, 341.) The "circumstances 
uader which the crime was in fact committed" cannot be'con-
sidered. (Ibid.) It has also been said that whether or not 
a crime involves moral turpitude does not depend upon "un-
necessary adjectives" added to the indictment by a "zealous 
and over-carefnl prosecutor" (United ,~tates v. Carrollo, 
svpra, 30 F.Supp. 3, 7), for such a holding would "make 
) 
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of law an unccrtain thing." (United States v, McCandless, 
supra, 28 F.2d 287, 288.) 
In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147 [73 P.2d 885], is not ineollsistent 
with the rule that the crime of which an attorney is COI1\'icted 
must necessarily involve moral turpitude to warrant summar." 
disbarment. The Hatch case was not a summary proceeding, 
since Hatch was given a hearing before this court and an 
opportunity to show that he was not guilty of moral turpitude. 
[12] The crucial question in the present proceeding, there-
fore, is whether or not an intent to defraud the United States 
is an essential element of the crime proscribed by section 
145, subdivision (b), of the Internal Revenue Code. If an intent 
to defraud is not an essential element and a person may be con-
victed thereunder without proof of that intent or other conduct 
evidencing moral tnrpitude, an attorney convicted of that 
crime cannot be summarily disbarred. [13] Since section 145, 
subdivision (b), is a United States statute, we must accept the 
interpretation given it by the United States courts. (Urie v. 
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 [69 S.Ct. 1018,93 L.Ed. 1282] ; 
Anderson v. Atchison, T. & 8. F. By. 00., 31 Cal.2d 117. 
121-122 [187 P.2d 729] ; Oaminetti v. Imperial Mutual Life 
Ins. 00., supra, 59 Cal.App.2d 476, 490; see also Hayashi v. 
Lorenz, 42 Cal.2d 848, 852 [271 P.2d 18] ; Op. Atty. Gen,. No. 
54/37, June 4, 1954, pp. 6-7.) 
These courts have definitely held that an intent to defraud 
is not an essential element of section 145, subdivision (b). and 
that a conviction under that section does not necessarily in-
volve moral turpitude. In United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 
518 [52 S.Ct. 416, 76 L.Ed. 917], the defendant was indicted 
for violating section 1114(b) [now § 145, subd. (b)] for at-
tempting to evade taxes by falsely understating taxable in· 
come. He contended that the general three-year period of 
limitations had expired and that the prosecution was there-
fore barred. The United States contended, however, that the 
special six-year statute of limitations applicable to offenses in-
volving fraud or attempts to defraud the government was con-
trolling. It urged, as the State Bar does in the present 
proceeding, that •• fraud is implicit in the concept of evading-
or defeating; and [that] •.. [a]ny effort to defeat or evade 
a tax is . . . tantamount to and . . . possess [es] every ele-
ment of an attempt to defraud the taxing body." (285 U.S. 
518, 520-521.) The Supreme Court noted that many statutes 
expressly make an intent to defraud an essential element of 
the offense, and that uuder these statutes ., an indictment 
) 
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railing to u\,(>r that ill/ellt wOllld he d('ffctive; hut nnder 
§ 1114(b) such an averment woulo be surplnsage, for it would 
be sufficient to plcad and prove a willful attempt to evade or 
defeat. (Citation.)" (285 U.S. 518, 521.) The court held that 
the general three-year statute of limitations covering offenses 
not involving fraud was applicable. Subsequently the Schar-
ton case was relied upon in holding that a statute (18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3287) suspending the statute of limitations during thl:' period 
of hostilities in World War II for offenses" involving fraud 
or attempted fraud against the United States" did not apply 
to a violation of section 145, subdivision (b). (United States 
v. Beard. 118 !<'.Supp. 297, 303.) It has also been held that the 
crime stated in section 145, subdivision (b), is not an offense 
involving "moral turpitude" for purposes of a statute (8 
U.S.C. § 1251. subdivision (a) (4» authorizing the deportation 
of resident aliens twice convicted of such offenses (United 
States v. Carrollo, S1tpra, 30 F.Supp. 3, 7; see also United 
States v. Neelly, supra, 208 F.2d 337, 340), and that the offense 
stated in section 145, subdivision (b), is not "inherently a 
drime," but is a crime mal1tm prohibitum. (United States v. 
Pendergast, 28 F.Supp. 601, 609.) . 
Two years after the decision in the Scharton case, the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 [54 
S.Ct. 223, 78 L.Ed. 381], had occasion to consider the meaning 
of the word "willfully" in section 145, subdivision (a), of the 
Internal Revenue Code.· In that case the defendant was in-
dicted for "willfully" refusing to supply information about 
deductions claimed in his tax returns. He based his refusal on 
a claim of privilege against self-incrimination under state 
statutes, but the court had held on an earlier appeal (United 
States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 [52 S.Ct. 63, 76 L.Ed. 210]) 
that the privilege could not be invoked. In defining the word 
"willfully" the court said that it "denotes an act which is 
intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from 
accidental. But when used in a criminal statute it generally 
·Section 145(a) states that any person "who willfully fails" to pay 
his taxes, make a return or declaration. keep records. and supply in· 
formation as required by law is guilty of a misdemeanor while section 
145(b) makes a willful attempt to evade or defeat a tax a felony. 
'rhe United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the element 
imported by the word "willfully" is the same for both crimes. and that 
the difference between the two offenses is to be found in the "positive 
attempt" that is required to violate section 145 (b). The difference is 
thus one between willful oll1i~~ion and willful commission. See. Spie.~ 
Y. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497·499 [63 S.Ct. 3G-!, 87 L.Ed. 418]. 
) 
:) 
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II1rans an act done with ban purpose [cifaliolls]; witllOUt 
jnstifiable excuse [citations]; stubbornly, obstinately, per-
versely [citations]. The word is also employed to characterize 
a thing done without gronnd for believing it is lawful [cita-
tion), or conduct marked hy careless disregard whether or 
not one has the right so to act [citations]." The court held 
that although the defendant's refusal to supply information 
was without legal justification, "the jury might nevertheless 
find that it was not prompted by bad faith or evil intent, which 
the statute makes an element of the offense." (290 U.S. 
389, 394, 398 [54 S.Ct 223, 78 L.Ed. 381] ; see also Arnold v. 
United States, 75 F.2d 144, 145-146.) A similar definition 
of the word" willful" as used in section 145, subdivision (b), 
has been given in a number of cases. (See Spies v. United 
States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 [63 S.Ct. 364, 87 L.Ed. 418] ; United 
States v. Martell, 199 F.2d 670, 672; Hargrove v. United 
States, 67 F.2d 820, 823 [90 A.L.R. 1276].) 
[14] The foregoing cases establish that fraud is not an 
essential element of the otYense proscribed by section 145, sub-
division (b), that some measure of bad faith or evil intent is 
an essential element, but that 8uchbad faith or evil intent, 
which can be inferred from evidence that the defendant acted 
without justifiable excuse, without ground for believing his 
acts were lawful, or in careless disregard of the lawfulness of 
his acts does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. 
This conclusion finds support in the decisions of the courts 
of other states in proceedings to disbar attorneys convicted 
of violating section 145, subdivision (b). Although most of 
these states have provisions for summary disbarment similar 
to that of California, in none of them was disbarment ordered 
solely on the record of conviction without an independent in-
vestigation of the question whether the attorney's conduct in-
volved moral turpitude. In In re Diesen, 173 Minn. 297 [217 
N.W. 356}, on which the State Bar relies, the court referred the 
proceeding to a referee to investigate the question of moral 
turpitude, and on the basis of his report suspended Diesen 
for a period of three years. The Supreme Court of Louisiana 
has established the practice of having .a committee of the 
State Bar Association investigate the question of misconduct, 
when an attorney has been convicted of violating section 
145, subdivision (b). (Louisiana State Bar Assn. v. Steiner, 
204 La. 1073 [16 So. 2d 843, 847] ; Louisiana State Bar Assn. 
v. (!annolly, 201 La. 342 [9 So.2d 582,592].) In the Connolly 
case, the State Bar Commissioner recommended that the pro-
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{'{'('Clings be dismissed beeause Connolly had produced evi,;,·l:.'C 
to show that, despite his conviction, he was free of •• dishonest 
and improper conduct." The court accepted the recommenda-
tion, concluded that no moral turpitude was involved in Con-
nolly's violation of section 145. subdivision (b), and dismissrrl 
the proceeding. (Louisiana State Bar Assn. v. Oonnolly, 206 
La. 883 [20 So.2d 168, 170-172].) In Rheb v. Bar Assn. of 
Raltimore, 186 Md. 200 [46 A.2d 289] (1945), the Supreme 
Court of Maryland said by way of dictum (at 204) that a 
violation of section 145, subdivision (a) [wilful failure to file 
a tax return] involves moral turpitude,· but its holding was 
squarely based on a Maryland statute that directs summary 
disbarment for "conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice." (186 Md. at 205.) The dictum in the Rheb case was 
relied upon in In ,.e Burrus, -- Mo. -- (258 S.W.2d 625, 
626] (1953), where the court found that a violation of section 
145, subdivision (a), involved moral turpitude. The Missouri 
court, however, examined the evidence presented in the tax 
trial, concluded that there were extenuating circumstances, and 
suspended Bnrrus for a period of one year. 
Although every conviction for violating section 145, sub-
division (b), may not involve moral turpitude, some convic-
tions may. In such cases discipline or disbarment should be im-
,posed by nonsummary procedures. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106 
et seq.) When, as in the present case, it appears that 
an attorney, whose conviction does not warrant summary 
disbarment, might nevertheless have been guilty of acts 
involving moral turpitude, we have established the prac-
tice of referring the matter to the State Bar for an investi-
gation of the question whether in the commission of the 
crime the convicted lawyer was guilty of misconduct that 
requires his suspension or disbarment. (In re Rothrock, 
supra, 16 Ca1.2d 449, 454; In ,.6 Richardson, 15 Ca1.2d 536, 
541 [102 P.2d 1076]; In re Boyd, Bar Misc. 2205, Minute 
Order, March 17, 1954.) [15] This court has inherent 
·Citing In rll Diesen, BUpra. It should be noted, however, that the 
Diesen case was decided before United States v. Scharton, Bupra, and 
that the statute nnder which Diesen was eonvicted specifically made 
fraud an element of the offense. The Maryland eourt also cited in 
support of its dictum, In rll Wi!tsill, 109 Wash. 261 (1~20) in which 
an attorney was disbarred for solieiting business and filing false claims 
for exemption from selective service. In re Peters, 73 Mont. 284 
(1925), also cited, was a disbarment proceeding base,} on Peters' con· 
viction for filing false reports as an officer of a bank with intent to 
deceive the U. S. Comptroller of Currency. 
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power over the admission, suspension, and disbarment of 
attorneys (Johnsoll v. State Bar,4 Cal.2d 744, 758 r52 P.2d 
928] ; 111 re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324. 327-328 [41 P.2d 161, 42 
P .2d 311] ), and in the exercise thereof can initiate disciplinary 
proceedings on its own motion (Bus. & Prof. Code § 6107) 
and, in so doing, it may adopt" any suitable process or mode 
of proceeding. 0 0'" (Code Civ. Proco, § 187; and see Barnes 
v. District Oourt 0/ Appeal, 178 Cal. 500, 504 [173 P. 1100J.) 
The motion to dismiss is denied and the matter is referred 
to the Board of Governors of the State Bar for a hearing, 
report, and recommendation on the question whether the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense 
of which Vincent W. Hallinan was convicted involved moral 
turpitude or other misconduct warranting disbarment or 
suspension. 
Shenk, J., Schauer, Jo, and Spence, J., concurred. 
Carter, J., did not participate herein. 
